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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Kaira Noelle Southworth challenges the district court’s decision to deny her motion to
suppress.

Because Officer Cushman did not have reasonable suspicion to believe that her

muffler or lane change violated Idaho Code, the district court erred by denying her motion.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Officer Cushman was about to pull onto Highway 95 when Ms. Southworth drove by.
(10/27/17 Tr., p.25, Ls.4–9; see Def. Ex. A (video taken by Officer Cushman’s dash camera).)
He pulled onto the highway behind her and saw her merge onto the first and then the second of
two left-hand turn lanes, stop at a flashing red light, and turn left onto Honeysuckle. (10/27/17
Tr., p.17, L.19–p.18, L.15, p.25, L.10–p.26, L.2.) He pulled Ms. Southworth over, allegedly
because she merged into the left turn lanes too slowly and because he thought her muffler was
too loud. (10/27/17 Tr., p.20, L.5–p.21, L.4.)
As for the slow lane change, Officer Cushman explained that Ms. Southworth “attempted
to make a lane change” but “just did it wrong”:
Well, as you’re going northbound on 95, and you’re approaching
Honeysuckle, and you want to make a left-hand turn, there are two left turn lanes
that begin—
....
And to make a proper lane change, you have to turn on your signal and
pick and lane and merge to that lane.
What she did was she basically merged across the first lane and then over
the dashed center line of the two turn lanes. She basically split those lanes and
drove over down both those lanes for almost the entire length of the—of the—that
the lanes existed, and then right before the end of ‘em, she finally drifted over into
the—the far left lane.
(10/27/17 Tr., p.17, L.19–p.18, L.7.) Ms. Southworth’s blinker was on as she made the lane
change (10/27/17 Tr., p.18, L.16–p.19, L.25), which was over about one-hundred yards or so
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(10/27/17 Tr., p.20, Ls.18–22.) Officer Cushman said that amounted to “inattentive driving” or
“failing to maintain lane.” (10/27/17 Tr., p.20, Ls.5–9.)
The other reason Officer Cushman stopped Ms. Southworth was because he believed her
exhaust system violated Idaho Code. (10/27/17 Tr., p.21, Ls.2–4.) He testified that he noticed
her muffler was loud after he came to a stop in the turn lane just to the right of Ms. Southworth
and she made her left-hand turn:
Q. So, would her vehicle have been accelerating at that point?
A. Yes.
Q. And are you familiar with cars generally?
A. A little bit.
Q. How long have you been a trooper?
A. Just over five years.
Q. And during that time do you regularly drive a motor vehicle as part of your
job?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you drive a motor vehicle in your personal life as well?
A. Yes.
Q. And in your job do you have the opportunity to regularly observe other motor
vehicles and hear them?
A. Thousands and thousands.
Q. Ok. In your experience does a vehicle, does its exhaust generally get louder
when it’s accelerating?
A. Yes.
Q. And does generally get [sic] quiet when it’s slowing down?
A. Yes.
Q. And what specifically did you observe or hear about Miss Southworth’s
vehicle when it began making that turn that drew your attention?
A. I’ve seen hundreds and thousands of those vehicles, and it was clearly louder
than, you know, most of it not a high percentage of all the other ones driving
down the road.
Q. In any of those vehicles are you referring to the GMC Sierra and Chevy
Silverado models?
A. Correct.
Q. Okay. So, based on your previous experience with hearing that same model of
vehicle, Miss Southworth’s vehicle sounded much louder than what you normally
hear; is that correct?
A. It was definitely louder.
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(10/27/17 Tr., p.26, L.3–p.27, L.13.) Officer Cushman admitted, however, that he did not know
the maximum decibel level for an exhaust system provided by Idaho Code (10/27/17 Tr., p.21,
Ls.5–7), did not know what decibel level Ms. Southworth’s system emitted (10/27/17 Tr., p.21,
Ls.8–10), did not know whether she was driving a GMC Sierra or Chevy Silverado,1 which were
“basically the same truck,” (10/27/17 Tr., p.6, Ls.3–11, p.32, Ls.7–17), did not know what sort of
exhaust system those trucks have or if they have the same exhaust system (10/27/17 Tr., p.32,
L.18–p.33, L.4), and had “no idea” when the last time was that he saw one of those trucks on the
road (10/27/17 Tr., p.33, Ls.6–9).
After pulling Ms. Southworth over and talking with her for about a minute, Officer
Cushman decided to get her out of her truck to perform a field sobriety test. (10/27/17 Tr., p.7,
Ls.1–16.) Ms. Southworth later blew .128 and .125, and Officer Cushman arrested her for
driving under the influence.

(10/27/17 Tr., p.28, Ls.5–11.)

When taking inventory of

Ms. Southworth’s truck, he found an open bottle of vodka behind the passenger seat. (R., p.13.)
The State charged Ms. Southworth with felony driving under the influence and
possession of an open container. (R., pp.57–58.) She moved to suppress all of the evidence
against her, arguing, among other things, that Officer Cushman lacked reasonable suspicion for
the stop. (R., pp.73–74, 83–92.) She asserted that the video showed that her lane change was
within the range of normal driving, and that Officer Cushman’s belief that her exhaust was too
loud was mere speculation. (10/27/17 Tr., p.34, L.19–p.37, L.7, p.46, Ls.10–23.) The State
countered that Officer Cushman had reasonable suspicion to believe that Ms. Southworth’s
muffler violated I.C. § 49-937; that when she changed lanes she failed to drive entirely within a

1

According to the pre-booking information sheet, Ms. Southworth was driving a 1997 GMC
Sierra. (R., p.14.)
3

single lane, as required by I.C. § 49-637(1); and that she changed lanes in violation of I.C. § 49808, which prohibits a driver from changing lanes or merging without giving an appropriate
signal and unless the change can be made “with reasonable safety.” (R., p.103.) As for the
muffler issue, the State asserted that,
Here we do have specific facts Trooper Cushman was able to point out
that he’s familiar with this model vehicle, it’s almost exactly the same as a Chevy
Silverado. The Court itself has probably observed these trucks, and it’s hard to
tell the difference unless you’re actually looking at the badging on it. They’re
very much the same vehicle.
Trooper Cushman I believe testified that he has observed thousands of
these vehicles. He’s very familiar with the level of noise they usually emit.
Based on that, Judge, he was able to point out specific articulable facts that caused
him to reasonably believe that this muffler was either modified or not in proper
working condition, as is required by Idaho code.
(10/27/17 Tr., p.41, Ls.4–17.)
The district court denied Ms. Southworth’s motion. (10/27/17 Tr., p.48, L.15–p.51, L.21;
R., p.115.) It explained its conclusion that the stop was justified by reasonable suspicion as
follows:
As I’ve stated, I’ve reviewed the video in [sic]. As far as the issue of the
loudness of the muffler, it was really impossible for me to determine one way or
the other with all of the background noise how loud the muffler was on the
defendant’s vehicle.
With respect to the issue of lane change, I’ve looked at that, and I think
that’s a close question but consistent with the officer’s testimony, the defendant’s
vehicle did continue down the center of the—both left-hand turn lanes for a
distance, which would be a violation of the traffic laws.
....
As I stated the burden is on the State to justify the stop. I believe the stop
here was justified based upon the officer’s testimony that the muffler was too
loud. The officer testified as to his familiarity with the vehicle or vehicles similar
to the defendant’s, and that the defendant’s muffler was louder than those
vehicles. The statements by the officer that the muffler was excessively loud or
not is not refuted.
With respect to the lane change, I stated earlier that the video shows,
consistent with the officer’s testimony, that there was an illegal lane change.
I might add that it seems when you’re driving you see a lot of people do
that same type of change, nevertheless, I think it is a violation of state law.
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(10/27/17 Tr., p.49, L.1–p.50, L.10.) In response to defense counsel’s question regarding what
code section Ms. Southworth had violated, the court said:
I didn’t find any specific one. I mean, there were two that were cited by the State.
The officer testified to that they could be either inattentive driving or an illegal
lane change. And I think the State in its brief referenced the Idaho code section
49-637(a), requires a vehicle to be driven entirely within a single lane.
(10/27/17 Tr., p.51, Ls.15–20.)
Ms. Southworth later pled guilty to felony driving under the influence, but reserved her
right to challenge the district court’s denial of her motion to suppress on appeal. (R., p.129;
see generally 11/6/17 Tr.) The court sentenced her to a unified term of four years, with two
years fixed, and retained jurisdiction.

(R., pp.151–53.)

(R., pp.154–56.)
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Ms. Southworth timely appealed.

ISSUE
Did the district court err by denying Ms. Southworth’s motion to suppress because Officer
Cushman did not have reasonable suspicion to believe that her muffler or lane change violated
Idaho Code?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred By Denying Ms. Southworth’s Motion To Suppress Because Officer
Cushman Did Not Have Reasonable Suspicion To Believe That Her Muffler Or Lane Change
Violated Idaho Code
The United States and Idaho Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 17. Warrantless searches and seizures are
presumptively unreasonable. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973); Halen v.
State, 136 Idaho 829, 833 (2002). To overcome that presumption, the State has the burden of
proving that the search or seizure falls within a well-recognized exception to the warrant
requirement and was reasonable in light of the surrounding circumstances. Schneckloth,
412 U.S. at 219; Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (overruled on other grounds
in Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1555 (2013)); Halen, 136 Idaho at 833. If the
government fails to meet this burden, the evidence acquired as a result of the illegal search or
seizure, including later-discovered evidence derived from the original illegal search, is
inadmissible. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963); State v. Koivu, 152 Idaho
511, 518–19 (2012).
To pass muster under the Fourth Amendment, warrantless seizures must generally be
based on probable cause. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499–500 (1983). However, limited
investigatory detentions are permissible when “justified by an officer’s reasonable articulable
suspicion that a person has committed, or is about to commit, a crime.” State v. Morgan,
154 Idaho 109, 112 (2013). “Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific, articulable facts
and the rational inferences that can be drawn from those facts. Reasonable suspicion requires
more than a mere hunch or inchoate and unparticularized suspicion. The test for reasonable
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suspicion is based on the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at or before the time
of the stop.” Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. This Court accepts the trial
court’s findings of fact if they are supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the
application of constitutional principles to the facts. State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 843 (2004)
(citing State v. Holland, 135 Idaho 159, 161 (2000)).
The district court erred when it concluded that Officer Cushman had reasonable suspicion
to stop Ms. Southworth for driving with too loud of a muffler and for making an illegal lane
change.

Because the stop violated Ms. Southworth’s constitutional right to be free from

unreasonable seizures, the court should have suppressed all of the evidence against her. This
Court should vacate her judgment of conviction, reverse the order denying her motion to
suppress, and remand her case to the district court.

A.

Officer Cushman Did Not Provide Specific, Articulable Facts To Support His Claim That
Ms. Southworth’s Muffler Violated I.C. § 49-937
According to I.C. § 49-937,
(1) Every motor vehicle shall at all times be equipped with a muffler in
good working order and in constant operation to prevent excessive or unusual
noise and annoying smoke, and no person shall use a muffler cut-out, bypass, or
similar device upon a motor vehicle on a highway. . . . No person shall
disconnect any part of that system except temporarily in order to make repairs,
replacements or adjustments, and no person shall modify or alter that system or its
operation in any manner, except to conform to the manufacturer’s specifications.
No person shall knowingly operate and no owner shall knowingly cause or permit
to be operated any motor vehicle originally equipped or required by any law or
regulation of the state or the federal government to be equipped with a noise
suppressing system while any part of that system is disconnected or while that
system or its operation is modified or altered in any manner, except to conform to
the manufacturer’s specifications.
....
(3) No person shall modify the exhaust system of a motor vehicle or a
motorcycle in a manner which will amplify or increase the noise of the vehicle or
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motorcycle above that emitted by the muffler originally installed on the vehicle by
the manufacturer.
(4) A showing that the sound made by a passenger motor vehicle or
motorcycle exceeds the maximum allowable decibel level shall be prima facie
evidence of a violation of subsection (1) of this section.
“[E]xcessive or unusual noise” means “any sound made by a passenger motor vehicle or a
motorcycle at any time under any condition of grade, speed, acceleration or deceleration, which
exceeds ninety-two (92) decibels . . . .” I.C. § 49-106(6); see also State v. Shearer, 136 Idaho
217, 220 (Ct. App. 2001). Therefore, “the ‘maximum allowable decibel level’ referenced in
I.C. § 49-937(4) is ninety-two decibels.” Shearer, 136 Idaho at 220.
Officer Cushman did not provide “specific, articulable facts” to support his claim that
Ms. Southworth’s muffler violated I.C. § 49-937. The facts he provided to support the stop
included that he is “a little bit” familiar with cars generally, he regularly drives for work and in
his personal life, he has had the opportunity to observe and hear “thousands and thousands” of
vehicles on the job, and has “seen hundreds and thousands of those vehicles [referring to GMC
Sierra and Chevy Silverado models], and [Ms. Southworth’s truck] was clearly louder than, you
know, most of it not a high percentage of all the other ones driving down the road.” (10/27/17
Tr., p.26, L.6–p.27, L.13.)

But Officer Cushman also admitted he did not know whether

Ms. Southworth was driving a GMC Sierra or Chevy Silverado, which he believed were
“basically the same truck,” did not know what sort of exhaust system those trucks have or if they
have the same exhaust system, and had “no idea” when the last time was that he saw one of those
trucks on the road (10/27/17 Tr., p.6, Ls.3–11, p.32, L.7–p.33, L.9). Officer Cushman did not
conclude that Ms. Southworth’s truck was too loud by comparing it to other cars on the road at
the time, as it appears to have been the only other vehicle on the road at the time (see Def. Ex. A
at 2:18:00–2:18:30), and he never gave any indication of how much louder Ms. Southworth’s

9

truck was than other vehicles he had heard in the past. (See generally 10/27/17 Tr.) Further,
Officer Cushman admitted that he did not know the maximum decibel level for an exhaust
system provided by Idaho Code, did not know what decibel level Ms. Southworth’s system
emitted (10/27/17 Tr., p.21, Ls.5–10), and did not testify that he had training to help him
determine whether an exhaust system emitted greater than ninety-two decibels, such as by
actually hearing what ninety-two decibels sounds like. (See generally 10/27/17 Tr., p.4, L.6–
p.33, L.11).
In short, Officer Cushman stopped Ms. Southworth because he simply thought her truck
was loud. The State therefore failed to prove specific, articulable facts amounting to reasonable
suspicion to believe that Ms. Southworth’s muffler violated I.C. § 49-937.
The Court of Appeals’ decision in State v. Meyer, 158 Idaho 953 (Ct. App. 2015), which
held that the deputy had reasonable suspicion to stop the driver for violating I.C. § 49-937, does
not dictate otherwise. There, the deputy
heard “a loud exhaust,” and the deputy discerned that the sound was coming from
a white Pontiac driving on a road approximately 200 feet away. According to the
deputy, the sound emitted by that car was about five or six points on a ten-point
scale, with ten being the loudest, whereas other cars on the road were producing a
sound of two or three points on the same scale. The sound was also louder than a
newer-model Pontiac that the deputy had previously owned.
Id. at 954. The Court of Appeals explained that,
the district court credited the deputy’s testimony that the deputy identified
Meyer’s car as making a louder-than-normal exhaust noise when the vehicle was
200 feet away from the deputy. Specifically, the deputy recalled that a normal car
would produce a sound of two or three points on a ten-point scale, whereas
Meyer’s car was producing a sound of five or six points on the same scale. Taken
together, these facts give rise to a particularized and objective basis for suspecting
that the white Pontiac, driven by Meyer, was in violation of I.C. § 49-937(1), and
thus the deputy acquired reasonable suspicion to stop the car.
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Id. at 955. The Court rejected Meyer’s argument that the officer “should have provided expert
testimony about the muffler or the sound it emitted, or evidence of what a device measured the
sound level of Meyer’s vehicle’s exhaust to be.” Id. Therefore, it concluded that, “the deputy’s
testimony that he was able to identify Meyer’s vehicle as producing an exhaust noise louder than
that of other cars provided reasonable suspicion that Meyer’s car was in violation of I.C. § 49937(1).” Id. at 956.
Meyer does not support the finding of reasonable suspicion here. In Meyer, the loud
muffler drew the deputy’s attention from two-hundred feet away, id. at 954, while Officer
Cushman was stopped just one lane over when he purportedly noticed Ms. Southworth’s muffler
was loud. (10/27/17 Tr., p.25, L.17–p.26, L.5.) The deputy in Meyer attempted to quantify just
how loud the muffler was by describing it as a six on a ten point scale, with the other cars on the
road being a two or three. 158 Idaho at 954. Officer Cushman, on the other hand, just said it
was “clearly louder” than “most of it not a high percentage of all the other” GMC Sierras or
Chevy Silverados he had heard at some unspecified time in the past, without saying how much
louder it was and without knowing what decibel level would actually amount to a violation of
I.C. § 49-937. (10/27/17 Tr., p.27, Ls.2–13, p.38, Ls.6–9.) Therefore, although the Court of
Appeals found that the testimony of the deputy in Meyer gave rise to a “particularized and
objective” basis for the stop, Officer Cushman’s testimony was nothing more than generalized
speculation. See Meyer, 158 Idaho at 955. The district court erred by concluding that Officer
Cushman had reasonable suspicion to believe that Ms. Southworth’s muffler violated I.C. § 49937.
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B.

Ms. Southworth’s Lane Change Did Not Violate I.C. § 49-637(1) Or I.C. § 49-808
Idaho Code § 49-637(1) provides that vehicles must “be driven as nearly as practicable

entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from that lane until the driver has first
ascertained that the movement can be made with safety.” And according to I.C. § 49-808,
(1) No person shall turn a vehicle onto a highway or move a vehicle right
or left upon a highway or merge onto or exit from a highway unless and until the
movement can be made with reasonable safety nor without giving an appropriate
signal.
(2) A signal of intention to turn or move right or left when required shall
be given continuously to warn other traffic. On controlled-access highways and
before turning from a parked position, the signal shall be given continuously for
not less than five (5) seconds and, in all other instances, for not less than the last
one hundred (100) feet traveled by the vehicle before turning.
Ms. Southworth did not violate either statute. It is undisputed that Ms. Southworth was
changing lanes when she supposedly violated I.C. § 49-637(1) and I.C. § 49-808. She signaled
her intent to merge left, and then made two lane changes over the course of approximately fifteen
seconds or one-hundred yards, with her blinker on the entire time. (Def. Ex. A at 2:18:00–
2:18:30; 10/27/17 Tr., p.20, Ls.18–22.) Idaho Code § 49-637(1)’s requirement that vehicles
must be driven “as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane” says absolutely nothing
about the speed with which a driver must accomplish a lane change. Similarly, neither Officer
Cushman’s testimony nor the video showed that Ms. Southworth failed to properly signal or that
she could not merge left with reasonable safety as required by I.C. § 49-808(1) and (2).
Therefore, Officer Cushman did not have reasonable suspicion to believe that Ms. Southworth
violated either I.C. § 49-637(1) or I.C. § 49-808(1)–(2).2

2

Officer Cushman testified that he believed the lane change also amounted to inattentive driving.
The State never argued as much, and with good reason. (R., pp.102–03; 10/27/17 Tr., p.39,
L.22–p.42, L.20.) Inattentive driving is “a lesser offense than reckless driving and shall be
applicable in those circumstances where the conduct of the operator has been inattentive, careless
or imprudent, in light of the circumstances then existing, rather than heedless or wanton, or in
12

The district court erred by concluding that Officer Cushman had reasonable suspicion for
the stop. Therefore, all evidence acquired as a result, including all later-discovered evidence
derived from the original illegal stop, is inadmissible. See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 485; Koivu,
152 Idaho at 518–19. The district erred by denying Ms. Southworth’s motion to suppress.

CONCLUSION
Ms. Southworth respectfully asks that this Court vacate her judgment of conviction,
reverse the order denying her motion to suppress, and remand her case to the district court.
DATED this 25th day of January, 2019.

/s/ Maya P. Waldron
MAYA P. WALDRON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 25th day of January, 2019, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant

MPW/eas

those cases where the danger to persons or property by the motor vehicle operator’s conduct is
slight.” I.C. § 49-1401. Nothing in either Officer Cushman’s testimony or the video gives
reason to believe that the lane change was inattentive, careless, imprudent, or dangerous.
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